Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'The Problem of Knowledge' and 'Introduction - Ontology'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
19463 Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
5500 Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
5494 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
19459 To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
19460 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
19461 Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19464 We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
19462 Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5496 Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
5499 A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
5501 People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]